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The present communication addresses (by way of a response to Andrei Khren-
nikov’s recent argument), the epistemology of quantum mechanics and Bohr’s in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity.
1 Introduction
In his posting to the ArXiv (quant-ph/0202107 v1), Andrei Khrennikov of-
fers what he calls the “Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” (alluding
perhaps to David Mermin’s “Ithaca Interpretation”) along with a critical com-
mentary on “the Copenhagen Interpretation” of quantum mechanics, and, in
Heisenberg’s famous phrase, the spirit of Copenhagen, and specifically Niels
Bohr’s views.a As his commentary refers, at arguably crucial points, to my
own discussions of these subjects, I would like to address some of his points
here. I also hope my remarks will help to clarify at least some of the aspects
of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, known as complementarity,
about which, the spirit and the letter of which, there are still so many miscon-
ceptions and so much confusion. One might take advantage of the pun on the
very word “letter” and see Bohr’s writings on complementarity as a letter or
several letters, which were written to Einstein in particular, but also to all of
us, and which are still awaiting their recipients at the post office of the history
of quantum theory. In this case (or perhaps in any case), however, having
received and even having read these letters by no means guarantees that they
have reached their destination, including in the case of the present author.
It is not entirely clear, and it did not appear to have been to Bohr, to what
degree these letters reached their destination in Einstein’s case. But they have
reached their destiny insofar as the Bohr-Einstein debate has fundamentally
shaped the history of quantum theory.
a Andrei Khrennikov, “Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” arXiv: quant-
ph/0202107 v1, 19 Feb 2002; On Mermin’s “Ithaca Interpretation,” see N. David Mermin,
“What Is Quantum Mechanics Trying To Tell Us?” American Journal of Physics 66 (9),
1998: 753-67.
1
It would be difficult for me to assess the merits of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation
itself, since, as an interpretation, it does not appear to me to be sufficiently
explicated in Khrennikov’s communication as an interpretation of quantum
mechanics as a physical theory. Accordingly, I shall not address it here. One
certainly cannot object to pursuing this type of program; and I find, in par-
ticular, the p-adic approach to quantum theory intriguing, at least from a
mathematical standpoint, even if only because the mathematics of p-adic num-
bers is very beautiful and quantum considerations may well contribute to this
mathematics. On the other hand, I found Khrennikov’s argument concerning
complementarity puzzling. The nature of my puzzlement stems primarily from
my view of complementarity as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, and
I shall restate this view first, in the first part, “The Spirit of Copenhagen,” of
this paper. My position is, by and large, similar to that of Bohr or Heisenberg,
although one might argue that they, especially Heisenberg, sometimes made
stronger claims for complementarity as an interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. There are also those who see complementarity or other interpretations
of quantum mechanics as actual descriptions of nature at the quantum level
rather than as specific interpretations of a particular theory or experimental
data it deals with and only in this, more limited, way telling us something
about nature or about ourselves in our interaction with nature through our
experimental technology. What these interpretations (there is no quantum
mechanics apart from them) tell us is of course the question. Then, I shall
address certain key aspects of complementarity that do not appear to me to
be sufficiently taken into account by Khrennikov’s paper. In the second part,
“The Letter of Copenhagen,” I shall comment on several specific points of the
paper, in particular those dealing with Bohr’s actual statements.b
2 The Spirit of Copenhagen
I see complementarity is an interpretation, a particular interpretation, of quan-
tum mechanics, but only one among other possible interpretations, of which
b I permit myself to refer to my previous works and further references in them, specifically
“Reading Bohr: Complementarity, Epistemology, Entanglement, and Decoherence,” Deco-
herence and its Implications for Quantum Computation and Information Transfer, T. Gonis
and P.E.A. Turchi (Eds.), IOS Press, 2001; Chapter 2, “Quantum Mechanics, Complemen-
tarity, and Nonclassical Thought,” of my book, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern
Science, Nonclassical Thought, and the “Two Cultures,” University of Michigan Press, 2002,
pp. 29-108; and “Quantum Atomicity and Quantum Information: Bohr, Heisenberg, and
Quantum Mechanics as an Information Theory,” forthcoming in the proceeding of the con-
ference, Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations, Va¨xjo¨, Sweden, 2001. I shall,
however, try to make my argument here sufficiently self-contained to be read without con-
sulting these works.
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there are now many (the assessment of their effectiveness is of course a different
matter).c Indeed, there is more than one version of complementarity, even in
Bohr’s own work, let alone if one considers the work of others who appeal to
complementarity, several founders of quantum mechanics among them. These
interpretations are sometimes assembled under the rubric of the Copenhagen
or, as it also called, orthodox interpretation, and often uncritically seen as
a single interpretation. Instead, the phrase “the Copenhagen Interpretation”
may be best seen as referring to a cluster of related interpretations of quantum
mechanics, which do share certain physical and epistemological features, but
which also, sometimes significantly and even fundamentally, differ, especially
in their epistemology. One should also be careful as regards Bohr’s own ver-
sions of complementarity, of which there is more than one as well. Here I shall
be specifically concerned with the post-EPR version of his interpretation, by
and large finalized by Bohr in his “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemologi-
cal Problems in Atomic Physics” (1949) and related later works.d In my view,
these works offer Bohr’s most consistent and most worked out exposition of his
argument, in part because this exposition (re)defines what constitutes individ-
ual physical phenomena that are and, in his view, could only be rigorously con-
sidered by quantum mechanics as, or, again, interpreted as, complementarity.
All relevant experimental data must be seen in accordance with this definition.
There are also different interpretations of complementarity itself, as Bohr’s in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics, whichever version of complementarity one
considers. This is of course also true with respect to other interpretations of
quantum mechanics, since whenever we consider such interpretations we also
interpret them. Accordingly, the present argument represents only an inter-
pretation of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, even leaving aside
those points of my argument whose attribution to Bohr’s view is uncertain, or
of course those that expressly depart from Bohr. I shall indicate these points
as I proceed.
Interpreted as complementarity, quantum mechanics is seen as a theory
that a) employs a mathematically rigorous formalism; and b) predicts, in sta-
c It is worth further specifying that by quantum mechanics itself I only mean the theory cov-
ered by the standard mathematical formalism in whatever version, beginning with Heisen-
bergs matrix formalism, rather than, say, any of the Bohmian hidden-variables theories.
Technically, there are further epistemological and even physical, and hence also interpretive,
complexities defined by particular versions of the mathematical formalism of quantum me-
chanics, such as that of Heisenberg vs. that of Schro¨dinger, but I shall put these complexities
aside here. In any event, the formalism in question is seen as enabling the predictions of the
data in question, such as the results of the double-slit experiments, the EPR correlations,
and so forth.
dNiels Bohr, Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, 3 vols., Ox Bow Press, 1988, vol. 2, pp.
32-66. This work will hereafter referred to as PWNB.
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tistical terms, the outcome of all relevant experiments within the scope of
phenomena it considers. In addition, there is no conflict between quantum
mechanics and other experimental data of physics, in particular (this becomes
crucial) relativity. Quantum mechanics is a local theory.
In this sense, quantum mechanics is as complete as classical physics. Com-
plementarity, however, makes quantum mechanics epistemologically different
from classical physics, insofar as, in this interpretation, quantum mechanics
only predicts the outcome of relevant experiments but does not describe, even
in principle and even as an idealization, the physical behavior of the ultimate
objects that it investigates, quantum objects, and that are responsible for the
appearance of the data in question. (Classical physics, specifically classical
mechanics, expressly does both, at least in idealized cases and, one might
add, in most interpretations of it, including by Bohr. For one could in princi-
ple interpret classical physics differently.) Indeed complementarity sees such a
description as, in principle, impossible. This view establishes the difference be-
tween Bohr’s and more traditionally positivist approaches, according to which,
roughly speaking, one merely need not be concerned with providing such a de-
scription. This difference is epistemologically crucial, even though it may not
be significant from the point of view of handling physics. Classical statistical
mechanics also does not describe the behavior of the individual constituents,
such as molecules, of the multiplicities it considers, but these constituents are
assumed to behave classically, specifically, according to the laws and pictures of
classical mechanics, which assumption is indeed crucial for the probability laws
and counting procedures of classical statistical mechanics. This assumption,
however, is not possible in complementarity in any circumstances, either in the
case of individual objects or quantum collectivities, which also restrict quantum
mechanics to statistical predictions concerning such behavior, or again, more
accurately, to the impact of such behavior upon measuring instruments. Quan-
tum mechanics can make some exact predictions, constrained by uncertainty
relations, for example, in the EPR situations, but by virtue of the limitations
imposed by uncertainty relations, such predictions are, from the perspective
of complementarity, never sufficient to allow one to assume a classical-like be-
havior of quantum objects. Nor, in this view, can one rigorously speak of
quantum objects themselves either as particles or as waves, or in terms of even
partial properties of particles or waves, or indeed in terms of any conceivable
physical objects or their attributes. The concept itself of an individual event
or phenomenon needs to be redefined in terms of observable effects of a given
interaction between quantum objects and the measuring instruments involved,
an interaction that is accordingly, irreducible, in contrast to what obtains in
classical physics. This redefinition also leads to a particular view of uncertainty
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relations, which, as I shall also explain below, now rigorously apply only to the
classical physical behavior of certain parts of measuring instruments.
These considerations do not of course imply that “quantum objects,” or
rather what we infer as such, do not exist. Quite the contrary; it is their ex-
istence that, in this view, prevents us from conceiving of the way they exist or
behave, or, to begin with, makes us infer the existence of such entities from
the experimental data in question. In other words, we are compelled to infer
this “inconceivable” from certain effects manifest in measuring instruments,
such as those of the double-slit experiments, while the particular character
of these effects, especially considered in their totality, prevents us from un-
ambiguously speaking of any properties, even single properties, of quantum
objects themselves or of their behavior.
Indeed, quantum mechanics as complementarity does not physically de-
scribe the behavior of any physical systems, including measuring instruments,
which are, in this interpretation, seen as described by means of classical physics.
More accurately (there is much misunderstanding on this point), classical
physics describes those, and only those, parts of measuring instruments where
the data in question is registered. By contrast, those components of measuring
instruments that interact with quantum objects (it is this interaction that is
responsible for the appearance of the effects in question) are quantum and,
hence, are themselves indescribable, as is the interaction itself by virtue of its
quantum character.
Of course, if one sees (as Einstein did) a physical description of the ulti-
mate objects of the theory as a requirement of completeness, then quantum
mechanics as complementarity would be incomplete. Accordingly, I call the
very possibility, available in and usually defining classical physics, of such a
description “classical.” (Bohmian theories, for example, would be seen as clas-
sical in this view, even though they should be rigorously distinguished from
Newtonian mechanics.) In other words, quantum mechanics may be incom-
plete by classical epistemological criteria, established largely on the basis of
classical physics or even a particular (causal and realist) interpretation of clas-
sical physics. This (i.e. classical) type of interpretation appears much more
difficult to attain and is perhaps (according to complementarity, definitively)
impossible in the case of quantum mechanics. In any event, short of this
requirement, which is, again, epistemological or philosophical, quantum me-
chanics as complementarity is complete within its proper scope, as complete
as classical physics is within its proper scope.
Is quantum mechanics as complementarity as complete as any theory of
quantum data can possibly be? I would not make such a strong claim and I do
not think that Bohr, or even Heisenberg, does either, although their position
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may, at points, be somewhat stronger than mine. (Khrennikov appears to
attribute a stronger position to my own argument as well.) It is, as I said,
true that there have been some who believed or argued, and some still do,
that this type of interpretation is inevitable, often without actually following
the interpretation itself (be it Bohr’s complementarity or other) to its radical
epistemological limits or even giving it a careful consideration at all.
It is in view of the considerations just given, especially the understanding
that complementarity is an interpretation, a particular interpretation, of quan-
tum mechanics (the standard quantum-mechanical formalism cum the data in
question), that some of Khrennikov’s arguments concerning complementarity
appear puzzling to me. For, it follows that, contrary to Khrennikov’s apparent
view, complementarity neither prohibits nor aims to prohibit the possibility
a) that quantum mechanics could be interpreted otherwise, as it has been
and continues to be, along all conceivable lines and, if anything, with increasing
profusion; and
b) that other theories (such as those of the Bohmian type) of the same
data could be offered.
Accordingly, Khrennikov’s apparent argument to the contrary appears to
me misplaced. This argument appears to assume that complementarity pro-
hibits certain epistemological alternatives, while I would argue that, as an
interpretation of quantum mechanics, complementarity prohibits certain epis-
temological (or ontological) features within its own framework, which other
interpretations or theories may allow. The assessment of such alternatives
themselves is, again, a different question.
I might add the following point to my argument for complementarity as
an interpretation, and only an interpretation (one among possible others), of
quantum mechanics. On the one hand, this argument may be seen as entailing
a weaker claim, again, possibly than that of Bohr himself or that of Heisenberg,
upon complementarity or quantum mechanics itself as concerns their relations
to nature at the ultimate level of its constitution (including whatever dynamics
behavior of possible constituents might be involved). Upon this constitution
complementarity makes no claim at all, and, by definition, it prohibits any such
claims as part of its own conceptual structure. On the other hand, however, it
follows that this impossibility of any description or conception concerning this
constitution is itself an idealization pertaining only to complementarity and
not to nature itself. Strictly speaking, one should, accordingly, put quotations
marks around “nature” (at least at that level), or “quantum,” “constituents,”
“dynamics,” “ultimate,” or indeed any term one might possibly use here. We
do not know whether such terms are ultimately applicable or not to “nature”
at that level. They are ultimately not applicable, anymore than “particles”
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or “waves,” in complementarity as an interpretation of quantum mechanics,
and function there only provisionally or metaphorically. They may be appli-
cable to a greater degree in classical-like physical theories or interpretations,
including those of quantum mechanics. The development of our theories (for
example, quantum field theories) and of their interpretations may lead to more
classical-like views of them and, possibly, of nature itself. It may, however, also
reveal even great complexities and yet more radical forms of inaccessibility or
inconceivability of “nature,” even though it appears difficult, if not impossible,
to go beyond complementarity on that score.
As concerns complementarity itself and substantive problems it may have
as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, it seems to me that Khrennikov’s
paper does not sufficiently take into account several among the key aspects of
this epistemology outlined above. In particular, Khrennikov’s argument con-
cerning the statistical view of quantum mechanics (including uncertainty rela-
tions) vs. the view of it as a description of individual processes or events does
appear to me to pay sufficient attention to one of the most crucial epistemolog-
ical aspects of complementarity. It is a subtle point and is indeed easy to miss,
in part since we tend to think of physical phenomena as pertaining to physical
objects our theories are concerned with. Bohr, however, terminologically and
substantively distinguishes observable phenomena, which manifest themselves
only in measuring instruments and which are always classical, and quantum
objects, which are never observable as such or, again, even conceivable in the
sense of any possibility of giving them any conceivable specific characteriza-
tion, be it conceptual, physical, or mathematical. Einstein, for example, did
not adequately consider this aspect of Bohr’s view either. The question is how
one understands or can possibly understand individual phenomena in dealing
with the data of quantum mechanics. As I said, Bohr, in part in response
to Einstein’s critique, was compelled to redefine the concept of the individual
phenomenon as applied to quantum data. According to this view, quantum
mechanics as complementarity only deals with individual phenomena in this
sense. This is why Bohr’s post-EPR version of complementarity is so crucial
and why it is perhaps the only fully developed version of it.
Now, if by individual processes and events one refers, as Khrennikov ap-
pears to do, to whatever happens at the level of quantum objects themselves,
then, contrary to his claim, Bohr’s complementarity cannot be seen, including
as regards uncertainty relations, as a theory of individual processes or events.
This view of it is not possible for the simple reason that, as explained above, it
does not describe any processes, individual or collective, at the quantum level,
or, as I said, at any level, leaving the description (always partial) of the behav-
ior of measuring instruments to classical physics. Indeed, as I stressed above,
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complementarity sees such a description, or any analysis or reference to the
properties of quantum objects or processes, as, in Bohr’s words, “in principle
excluded” (PWNB 2:62). Complementarity is, however, a theory of individual
phenomena, and indeed, in terms of physics, a theory only dealing individual
phenomena, in a different sense. It provides rigorous predictions concerning
occurrences of individual phenomena in Bohr’s sense and only concerning such
occurrences. Each such phenomenon is defined in terms of a single classical ef-
fect, such as a “dot” on the screen in the double-slit experiment, of the interac-
tion between the irreducibly indescribable quantum objects and indescribable
quantum parts of measuring instruments upon the classically describable parts
of measuring instruments. This, crucially, includes a rigorous specification of
the conditions of a given experiment (PWNB 2:64). In Bohr’s interpretation,
the influence of these conditions can never be eliminated in considering the
outcomes of quantum-mechanical experiments in the way it can, at least in
principle, be done in classical physics. Thus, a dot on the screen in the double-
slit experiment would be seen as (a part of) a different type of phenomenon
depending upon the possibility of knowing through which slit an “object” that
left the dot (as a trace of its collision with the screen) has passed. (I underline
“type” because, ultimately, each phenomenon is different and indeed unique
in this interpretation.) If seen independently of the quantum-mechanical con-
text of its appearance, each mark on the screen in the double-slit experiment
would be perceived in the same way or as the same phenomena in the sense
of the philosophical (say, Husserl’s) phenomenology of consciousness. Such a
mark would appear as the same regardless of the difference in the conditions
and, hence, outcome (” interference” or ” no interference” ) of the double-slit
experiment. According to Bohr’s understanding, however, each mark is seen
as a different individual phenomenon or as a part of a different phenomenon
depending on and including these conditions, which are always mutually ex-
clusive in the case, such as this, of complementary phenomena. In classical
mechanics such conditions would of course be the same, assuming that we deal
with particles (in the case of waves they would be the same but there would
be no point-like traces and different equations, wave equations, would apply).
Quantum-mechanical predictions, including numerical statistical predictions
crucially depend on this distinction as well. (Mathematically, these predic-
tions may be seen in terms of contextual probability in Khrennikov’s sense,
although the physical content would be seen differently from the point of view
of complementarity.) Thus, in the double-slit experiment, rather than dealing
with two phenomena, each defined by a different multiplicity of spots on the
screen, we deal with two distinct multiplicities of individual phenomena, de-
fined by each spot. Each of the latter is indivisible—two sets of phenomenal
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atoms or atomic phenomena in Bohr’s nonclassical sense—depending on two
different sets of conditions of the experiment. One of these sets of conditions
will lead to the emergence of the interference pattern, “built up by the accu-
mulation of a large number of individual processes, each giving rise to a small
spot on the photographic plate, and the distribution of these spots [following]
a simple law derivable from the wave analysis” (PWNB 2: 45-46). Each sin-
gle spot, however, must be, again, seen as a different individual phenomenon,
which depends on the conditions in which the event occurs. Two different
overall patterns, ” interference” and “no-interference,” pertain, thus, to two
(very large) sets of different individual phenomena. Far from being a mat-
ter of convenience, this distinction between two multiple-spot phenomena and
two multiplicities of spot-phenomena is essential for Bohr’s meaning and the
consistency of his argumentation. First, no paradoxical properties, such as si-
multaneous possession of contradictory wave-like and particle-like attributes on
the part of quantum objects themselves, are involved. Secondly, and perhaps
most crucially, in our analysis we can never mix considerations that belong to
complementary experimental set-ups in analyzing a given experimental out-
come, even when dealing with a single spot on the screen, as we could, in
principle, do in the case of classical physics. This is not an uncommon error
(at least as Bohr’s interpretation and arguments are concerned), including in
some of Einstein’s arguments, which could indeed lead to the appearance of
paradoxes, on which point I shall comment in the next section in the context
of the EPR argument and counterfactual logic. The latter, however, disappear
once this rule of complementarity as mutual exclusivity of such considerations
is followed. Throughout his arguments with Einstein, Bohr stresses in such
situations, which are invoked in most of Einstein’s arguments, including of the
EPR type, ” we must realize that . . . we are not dealing with a single spec-
ified experimental arrangement, but are referring to two different, mutually
exclusive arrangements” (PWNB 2:57). These considerations clearly pertain
to the question of counterfactual reasoning in quantum mechanics. They are
also crucial in the context of contextual probabilities and, especially, their
physical interpretation, and are, I would argue, not sufficiently addressed in
Khrennikov’s paper.
Any further analysis of such phenomena is, again, “in principle excluded.”
Accordingly, complementarity makes the unknowable—something that cannot
in principle be known—part, indeed an irreducible part, of the knowledge that
it provides, since this unknowable has fundamental effects upon what we can
know. These effects are the data of quantum physics, according to comple-
mentarity. Given the particular character of the totality of such effects (e.g. in
the double-slit or the EPR experiment), most such predictions, Bohr argues,
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can only be statistical. As Bohr says, however, “It is most important to realize
that the recourse to probability laws under such circumstances is essentially
different in aim from the familiar application of statistical considerations as a
practical means of accounting for the properties of mechanical systems of great
structural complexity [as, for example, in classical statistical physics]. In fact,
in quantum physics, we are presented not with intricacies of this kind, but
with the inability of the classical frame of [physical] concepts to comprise the
peculiar feature of indivisibility, or ‘individuality,’ characterizing the elemen-
tary processes [defined in terms of phenomena in Bohr’s sense, rather than in
terms of quantum objects themselves and their behavior]” (PWNB 2:34). In
other words, it is the irreducibly unknowable nature of quantum objects and
their quantum interaction with the quantum parts of measuring instruments
even in each individual case that are responsible for the irreducibly statisti-
cal character of quantum-mechanical predictions. By the same token, why a
particular statistical counting works in quantum mechanics is in turn beyond
the possible purview of the theory (interpreted as complementarity), in con-
trast to classical statistical mechanics, or elsewhere in classical physics where
statistical predictions apply (as in predicting the probability in throwing dice.
There the statistical behavior and particular ways of counting are explained
from the classical, Newtonian, causal behavior of each individual constituent
of a given multiplicity, and their interactions, although the large number and
the structural complexity of the components (be they objects, forces, factors,
or whatever) make it impossible to describe each such constituent. In quantum
mechanics, as complementarity, this type of description is never possible even
when the maximal information concerning any individual situation is available,
and, again, no description of any kind concerning quantum objects themselves
or their quantum interactions is ever possible. It is in this (physical) sense that
quantum probabilities are irreducible, the sense, I would argue, not sufficiently
considered in Khrennikov’s criticism of Bohr and complementarity, specifically
as concerns the question of probability.
Some exact predictions are possible in quantum mechanics. They are,
however, never sufficient to reconstitute a classical-like situation even at the
level of measuring instruments, whose behavior in these experiments is, while
classically described, subject to an only partial rather than complete classical
treatment. The reason for this is that, in view of uncertainty relations, one can
only establish at most half of the (conjugate) variables involved in and neces-
sary for a complete classical description. It is worth stressing that quantum-
mechanical statistical predictions involve particular (EPR) correlations and,
hence, a certain form of order not found in classical physics. Accordingly, as
indeed became apparent already in Planck’s Law, the statistical counting in
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all quantum theories, including in quantum statistical theories, is not the same
as in classical statistical physics, even though mathematically one deals with
probabilities in both cases. (Whether quantum probability is Kolmogorovian
has been a matter of some debate, however. I leave aside the question of the
relationships between Kolmogorovian probability and contextual probability
in Khrennikov’s sense.) While each individual event, such as registering a
“dot” or a “click” (it actually has a complex structure), is a random event, the
collective accumulation (a temporal process!) exhibits a certain pattern, an ”
interference pattern” (using this term with caution, since there are no physical
waves involved), in a double-slit experiment. In this sense, again contrary to
Khrennikov’s argument, complementarity is a statistical interpretation. It is
an irreducibly statistical theory of both individual and collective (rather than
only collective) physical phenomena.
The uncertainty relations fit nicely into this scheme. Any measurement
could only involve a determination and indeed, according to Bohr, a definition
of one of the two conjugate variables for the relevant part of the measuring
instrument involved (once again, nothing else is subject to measurement or
prediction in complementarity), while Heisenberg’s formula would require sta-
tistical confirmation and may be also derived statistically. Accordingly, it does
not appear to me that there is any logical inconsistency here, as Khrennikov
appears to suggest. Let me note that to some degree, uncertainty relations are
a remnant of classical mechanics. Technically, one can see quantum mechanics
or, indeed even more so, quantum field theory, as a theory of statistical distri-
butions of certain individual events (dots, spots, traces, clicks, etc.), a theory
predicting such distributions, without any appeal whatsoever to uncertainty
relations or any mechanical variables of quantum objects.
I do see in Khrennikov’s paper an argument that the epistemology of com-
plementarity is unsatisfying (basically Einstein’s point) or at least that one
does not have to accept it and that alternatives could be offered, or, in view of
this dissatisfaction, should be (also Einstein’s point) offered. Indeed, Khren-
nikov’s main desiderata are very much those of Einstein. Quantum mechan-
ics was acceptable to Einstein as a statistical theory, while he hoped that a
classical-like, realist and preferably causal, alternative describing the individ-
ual behavior of individual quantum objects could eventually be found. Ein-
stein’s analysis of the situation itself was different from Khrennikov’s in that
Einstein did not see how quantum mechanics in its standard version could
account for individual events and processes at the quantum level, that is, in
terms of independent properties of quantum objects and processes, at least
without violating locality/relativity. (I put aside for the moment the role of
the EPR correlations in shaping his view, which I have considered in the works
11
cited above, and I, again, permit myself to refer to them.) Einstein saw quan-
tum mechanics, including in Bohr’s interpretation, as irreducibly statistical in
the sense of dealing only with ensembles (of quantum entities). Bohr tried to
counter, along the lines here sketched, that it was, in his interpretation, also
a theory of individual classical phenomena, that made any account of such
phenomena (i.e. predictions concerning them, since nothing else is possible in
Bohr’s interpretation) unavoidably statistical. He was not very successful in
this argument (Einstein accepted only some of Bohr’s points). This is hardly
surprising since Einstein was, at best, reluctant to see any theory not dealing
with its ultimate objects, in this case quantum objects, as ultimately accept-
able. He found Bohr’s view ‘’so very contrary to his scientific instincts,” the
statement that Bohr does not fail to cite (PWNB 2:61). Thus interpreted,
quantum mechanics was almost not physics to Einstein (indeed I am not sure
that “almost” is necessary here). In a way, he was not wrong, since (this is
one of my main points in “Quantum Atomicity and Quantum Information” )
Heisenberg’s “new kinematics” already renounced this type of description and
dealt in fact or in effect with spectra as defined by the effects of the inter-
action between quantum objects and measuring instruments along the lines
here outlined. This “kinematics” might have been better called “quantum in-
formatics,” since it was not really kinematics, insofar as it did not deal with
the motion of quantum objects. Einstein, however, also accepted that no such
alternative was available, either in terms of a more acceptable interpretation
of the quantum-mechanical formalism (which did not appear to him likely or
even possible in view of locality considerations), or in terms of, at the time,
alternative forms of formalism that would handle the data in question. He
did not view Bohm’s 1952 theory as such an alternative, primarily, I think,
in view of its inherently nonlocal character. Incidentally, Schro¨dinger’s view
of the quantum-mechanical situation was pretty much the same. This appar-
ent lack of rigorously developed alternatives also partially explains why Bohr
and Heisenberg were sometimes less careful than perhaps they should have
been as concerns the fundamentally interpretive character of complementarity,
and sometimes dismissive of counterarguments concerning it, although Bohr
patiently and painstakingly replied to all Einstein’s counterarguments.
Indeed, no such classical-like (realist and causal) and, this is again crucial
(especially in the context of Bohmian mechanics), also local alternative may as
yet be available. This is not to say that it is in principle impossible, although
Bell’s and related theorems, such as the Kochen-Specker theorem, appear to
make it nearly impossible. I would not go so far as to argue that there are
no rigorously worked out or viable alternatives to complementarity, especially
those dealing with the standard formalism, which would be difficult to do,
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given the profusion of available interpretations, although I am tempted to
think that this is the case. Indeed, it is not always clear how much of an
alternative some of them really are, once they are rigorously considered or,
to begin with, sufficiently worked out in terms of their physics, rather than
hypothetical or semi-hypothetical proposals, which is indeed a crucial point.
I comment on some among recent interpretations from this perspective in ”
Reading Bohr.” Most of these interpretations are not causal or realist in the
way Einstein wanted, or in the way some Bohmian theories are, although they,
by and large, also want to dispense with the role of measuring instruments. It
is, again, another question how successfully.
Let me say a few words concerning the Bohmian approach(es), which, I
stress, are not quantum mechanics and deploy, in fact or in effect, a different
mathematical formalism. I say “in fact or in effect” because certain versions
of these theories, such as Bohm’s 1952 version, do in fact use the standard,
say, Schro¨dinger’s, formalism, while explicitly assigning trajectories to particles
(in these theories there indeed are particles as well as waves associated with
individual particles), which the standard quantum mechanics does not do.
This assignment, however, implies the presence of an additional differential
equation not found in the standard theory. So, in effect, the formalism is
different in this case as well. This equation introduced nonlocality, as well
as causality (to the degree that one can speak of causality given nonlocality),
into the theory, even though the theory, it is worth keeping in mind, is not
classical either (i.e. is not a theory of the type of Newtonian mechanics and
is indeed closer to quantum mechanics than to classical mechanics). This—
nonlocality—is, in my view, the primary reason why the Bohmian approach
is a minority, a small minority, view of quantum mechanics, although, as you
observe, other factors play a role as well. There are arguments, such as those
by Henry Stapp, that the standard quantum mechanics is nonlocal as well.
These arguments, at least so far, have not been effective or, I would argue,
sustainable. Accordingly, given the current state of physics, and specifically
the extraordinary success of quantum mechanics and its extensions in quantum
field theory in enabling theoretical predictions of the outcome of experiments,
it does not appear to me that Bohmian theories are likely to have a greater
impact in the current practice of theoretical physics. (Their mathematical
aspects are obviously another matter). I might of course be wrong. I can
hardly see Bohmian approaches as any less “romantic” in Khrennikov’s sense
(I shall explain my emphasis presently) or, correlatively, any more realist or
realistic than Bohr’s—quite the contrary, in many respects it seems to me
more romantic and less realistic, albeit realist. Bell used similar terms in his
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criticism of Bohr et al., on which I commented elsewhere.e
On the other hand, as a scholar of Romanticism (which is my literary field),
I would argue that historically Romanticism, for example that of Ho¨lderlin,
Kleist, Blake, Shelley and Keats, is indeed epistemologically closer to Bohr
than to most realisms. But this Romanticism may be more realistic or even
more rigorously realist, insofar as it is scrupulously attentive to the limits
within which the concept of reality can and must apply, than most professed
realisms. Both the dead nature and life, or the human mind and culture, may
ultimately be better approached from this Romantic perspective. One cannot,
however—this perspective also tells us—ever be fully certain.
3 The Letter of Copenhagen
In this section I shall comment on several specific points of Khrennikov’s paper,
pertinent to the above argument, and most of my points here indeed follow
more or less immediately from that argument. The page numbers below refer
to those of Khrennikov’s paper.
Andrei Khrennikov (hereafter AK): “I do not think that understanding of
. . . [the] contextual structure of physical theories . . . [i.e. that physical theories
describe properties of pairs, physical system and measuring device] really was
Bohr’s invention” (p. 2).
Arkady Plotnitsky (hereafter AP): It depends on what one means by con-
textual, more specifically, what is the epistemology of a given form of contex-
tualism. Indeed, it seems to me that contextualism needs to be more sharply
defined by Khrennikov, especially in physical terms and in relation to the
dependence of the outcome of measurements on different experimental set-
ups (such as those in the double-slit experiment). Insofar as contextualism is
seen as the argument that the outcome of experiments, including statistical
predictions (for example, in terms of contextual probabilities), fundamentally
depends on a given experimental set-up, Bohr may well have invented it. He
would of course question certain physical assumptions implicitly underlying
Khrennikov’s argument for the role of contextual probabilities in quantum me-
chanics.
AK: “It was clear to everybody that physical observables are related to
properties of physical systems as well as measuring devices” (p. 2).
AP: This statement (which needs to be more sharply formulated in any
event) is true in one, more or less trivial, sense: it has indeed always been
recognized that some measuring devices (even if only human organs) are nec-
e Arkady Plotnitsky, Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida, Duke
University Press, 1994, pp. 182-85.
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essary to establish and relate (observe, measure, etc.) such properties. On
the other hand, in classical physics, this interaction between physical objects
under investigation and measuring instruments could, in Bohr’s words, always
be “neglected or compensated for,” at least in principle. In this sense the rel-
evant properties of objects, such as, say, the position and the momentum of
a given body, can be considered as independently existing and could, at least
in principle, both be simultaneously determined within a single experimental
arrangement, although in practice different arrangements are often used. By
the same token, while classical physical theories must indeed rely on measur-
ing instruments to confirm their descriptions and predictions, they describe,
at least in principle, independent properties of physical systems under investi-
gation, and predict the values of these properties. As I have explained above,
this is not the case in quantum mechanics; and, this is, again, the crux of
Bohr’s argument, where it is, at least in his interpretation, impossible to refer
unambiguously to such properties. It is, in principle, impossible to dissoci-
ate quantum objects from their interaction with the measuring instruments
involved and isolate them in the way it is possible, at least in principle, in clas-
sical physics. In Bohr’s interpretation, there are neither waves nor particles,
nor indeed anything specifiable at the quantum level. One deals only with
particular effects of the interactions between “quantum objects” and measur-
ing instruments upon those instruments, if one can still, in all rigor, even use
such terms as “quantum” and “objects,” although one can rigorously speak
of measuring instruments, that is, their classically describable parts. The fun-
damental dependence of the outcomes of predictions on specific experimental
set-ups is an immediate consequence. This, epistemologically radical or, as
I like to call it, nonclassical, contextualism may well be Bohr’s (and Heisen-
berg’s) invention.
AK: “The main invention of N. Bohr was not contextuality, but comple-
mentarity. Bohr’s greatest contribution was the recognition of the fact that
there exist complementary experimental arrangements and hence complemen-
tary, incompatible, pairs . . . . I think nobody can be against the recognition
of such a possibility. Why not? Why must all contexts, complexes of physical
conditions, be coexisting? Contextuality and complementarity are two well un-
derstandable principles (not only of quantum physics, but physics in general)”
(p. 2).
AP: This statement does not seem to me to be altogether accurate. First
of all, it, again, depends on what kind of contextuality one has in mind. As
I said above, both contextuality (in the sense of the irreducible dependence
of the outcome of an experiment on the experimental set-up and, as a result,
the rigorous impossibility of ascribing anything to quantum objects or con-
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sidering them apart from their interactions with measuring instruments) and
complementarity (in Bohr’s rigorous sense of the irreducible mutual exclusivity
of measuring procedures) are, according to Bohr’s interpretation, irreducible
only in quantum, but not in classical, physics. In particular, as I said, in
classical physics it is, at least in principle, possible to measure both the po-
sition and the momentum of a given body within the same experimental ar-
rangement, although in practice different arrangements are often used. This is
never possible in quantum mechanics in view of the uncertainty relations. It
may be worth stating this point in more rigorously Bohrian terms, defined by
the fact since no properties, such as those of position and momentum, could
be attributed to quantum objects, not even each such property by itself. No
quantum-mechanical measurement allows one both to fix both a space-time
reference frame for any position determination and to measure a change of the
momentum of the relevant parts of measuring instruments, in the way it could
be done when we measure a classical object in classical physics. In quantum
measurement (in this interpretation) we can do either one or the other, but
never both together. Both this radical type of “contextuality” (this is of course
not Bohr’s term, perhaps because in itself it does not convey the epistemolog-
ically radical nature of his idea) and complementarity may be seen as Bohr’s
conceptions.
AK: “The real problem was that N. Bohr as well as W. Heisenberg (but
merely further generations of their adherents) did not pay attention that quan-
tum complementarity is the experimental fact concerning pairs
pi = (elementary particle, macroscopic measuring device)
and not elementary particles by their sel[ves]. It is a pity that the greatest
promoters of contextualism forgot about contextual basis of complementarity”
(p. 2).
AP: This is manifestly incorrect, since, as was shown in the preceding dis-
cussion, Bohr’s complementarity only concerns experimental arrangements in
their interaction with “quantum objects.” (It can be shown that Khrennikov’s
statement is not true about Heisenberg either.)
AK: “. . . complementarity of contexts in quantum physics does not imply
complementarity of corresponding objective properties (of elementary parti-
cles) contributing into such observables” (p. 2).
AP: Bohr, as I explained above, never said that it would or, again, could,
given that no such properties could be ascribed to quantum objects.
AK: “In particular, contextual complementarity does not imply that ele-
mentary particles do not have objective properties at all. In particular, there
are no reasons to suppose that it is impossible to provide a kind of hidden vari-
able, HV, description (ontic description . . . ) for these objective properties”
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(p. 2).
AP: As I said, for Bohr complementarity does in fact imply precisely this
impossibility of speaking of independent objective properties of quantum ob-
jects, as Khrennikov indeed acknowledges later in the article. Of course, as I
also said, this does not prevent one from making this type of presupposition,
trying to pursue it, and connect it with, in Khrennikov’s terms, “contextual
complementarity.” This is, for example, Bohm’s program. The question is
how successful one is in this pursuit. Bohm’s theory may indeed be seen as
achieving something of that type, but, again, at the expense of introducing
nonlocality as a mathematical consequence of the theory. Hence, also the sig-
nificance of Bell’s and related theorems in assessing such projects. And, as
I said, it is not clear to me how p-adic hidden variable theories fare in this
respect, or how they actually relate to experimental results, to begin with.
Perhaps, they can reproduce quantum-mechanics predictions while avoiding
nonlocality. Can they? Even if they can, it would still leave other problems
as concerns relating this type of mathematics to anything physical. As Khren-
nikov acknowledges, this remains a hypothetical proposal: “the development
of alternative (nonreal, noncontinuous) classical models, e.g. p-adic . . . , might
play important role in clarification of foundations of quantum theory” (p. 3;
emphasis added). They might, but then they also might not.
AK: “On the other hand, an adherent of N. Bohr [Plotnitsky] would argue
that ‘Such a separation and, hence, the description of (properties of) quan-
tum objects and processes themselves (as opposed to certain effects of their
interaction with measuring instruments upon latter) are impossible in Bohr’s
interpretation,’ ” (p. 3).
AP: Obviously, I agree, since this is indeed what I say; and I am grateful
to Khrennikov for his choice of quotation here. I only direct one’s attention
to the significance, a fundamental significance, of my qualification “in Bohr’s
interpretation,” which must be viewed along the lines outlined above and which
does not appear to me to be sufficiently taken into account by Khrennikov.
AK: “I think that the origin of such an interpretation of complementar-
ity by N. Bohr was the individual interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle [uncertainty relations?]: ∆q∆p ≥ h/2.”
AP: As I said, Khrennikov’s discussion of uncertainty relations appears to
me to misconceive Bohr’s or (admittedly, this would require a separate discus-
sion) Heisenberg’s view, as explained above and in more detail in my works
cited earlier. In particular, Khrennokov says: “Unfortunately, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relation was interpreted as the relation for an individual elemen-
tary particle” (p. 3). First of all, one might ask: By whom, specifically? It
was by some, to be sure, but certainly not by Bohr, at least not in this sense,
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but only in the sense of individual phenomena, as explained above, that is, in
relation to certain parts of measuring instruments in two possible but always
mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. I leave aside Khrennikov’s his-
torical commentary, which is far too sketchy and incomplete, and is not really
germane to the argument.
AK: “The main problem was mixing by W. Heisenberg of individual and
statistical uncertainty. For example, in his famous book [The Physical Princi-
ples of Quantum Theory] he discussed the uncertainty principle as a relation for
an individual system, but derived this principle by using statistical methods!”
(p. 3).
AP: This sounds to me confused, at least as stated, including as concerns
the difference between the uncertainty principle and uncertainty relations, and,
in any event, this point is not sufficiently explained by Khrennikov. As I
said, one can, and in quantum mechanics perhaps must, rigorously combine
individual and statistical considerations. So it is not clear why this is a problem
or what the problem in fact is. This needs to be explained further as, in my
view, does most of Khrennikov’s commentary on uncertainty relations.
AK: “In any case the absence of continuous classical model for motion of
electron in Bohr’s atom does not imply impossibility to create other, noncon-
tinuous, classical (causal deterministic) models” (p. 4).
AP: Yes, but, again, the question is how effective such models are, and in-
deed whether we really do have them or whether we can seem them as classical,
and in what sense. Indeed, it is quite clear that “mixing” or, I would say, con-
joining the classical and the continuous is not as misconceived as Khrennikov
appears to think (pp. 4-5).
AK: “Moreover, considerations of W. Heisenberg . . . [in his original matrix
mechanics paper] did not [even] imply [the] impossibility to create [a] continu-
ous classical model—as it was claimed by W. Heisenberg and then by N. Bohr.
The story is much simpler: first Bohr tried to create such a thing, but could
not; then Heisenberg, with the same result. After this it was claimed that
such a model did not exist. And what is the most interesting: not only for
Bohr’s model of atom (well it might be), but for any other model. . . I cannot
understand this kind of ‘quantum logic’ ” (p. 4).
AP: Again, claimed by whom, specifically? The nature of Bohr’s and
Heisenberg’s claims was, it seems to me, more complicated. But in any event,
my argument above concerning the interpretive nature of complementarity
obviously leaves space for a search for alternatives, even if, again, my view may
stress the interpretive nature of complementarity more than others (possibly
including Bohr and Heisenberg).
AK: “So Bohr’s complementarity was a kind of individual complementarity.
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Complementary features were regarded [as belonging?] to individual physical
systems. It is a pity that contextualists N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg related
the uncertainty relation[s] not to some special class of measurement procedures
of the position and momentum described by quantum formalism, but to the
position and momentum of an individual elementary particle” (p. 5).
AP: As shown by the above argumentation, this is manifestly incorrect
as stated, and appears to flatly disregard both Heisenberg’s and Bohr’s ar-
guments, extending from Heisenberg’s new kinematics to Bohr’s post-EPR
arguments for complementarity.
AK: “This imply the prejudice that the position and momentum even in
principle could not be determined simultaneously and, moreover, that it is
even in principle impossible to assign such a physical property, e.g. position
or momentum, to e.g. electron: ‘electron does not have trajectory’ ” (p. 5).
AP: This is, in my view, not simply a prejudice (a view in part resulting
perhaps from the preceding incorrect statement of Khrennikov’s paper, just
cited), but, at least, an interpretation, and alternatives are not easy to offer.
Bohmian theories, which have trajectories, are nonlocal, and indeed they are
nonlocal because they have trajectories. And then, can one speak physically of
p-adic, and hence discontinuous, trajectories? This may not be impossible, but
it is not easy, assuming, again, that such theories could be properly developed,
including as classical.
AK: “In fact, the only possible conscious [?] interpretation of Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle is the statistical contextual interpretation . . . . It is im-
possible to prepare such an ensemble of elementary particles that dispersions
of both position and momentum observables would be arbitrary small. Ev-
erybody would agree that only this statement can be verified experimentally.
Contextualism has to be statistical contextualism and, consequently, comple-
mentarity has to be statistical contextual complementarity. Such contextualism
and complementarity do not contradict to the possibility of [a] finer description
of reality than given by quantum theory” (pp. 5-6).
AP: It is true that they do not contradict this possibility. But, again, a
possibility is not an actuality. It is Bohr’s interpretation of uncertainty rela-
tions that at any given point only one of the two conjugate variables involved
(pertaining to certain parts of the measuring instruments used) could be de-
fined rather than only measured with full precision within the capacity of our
measuring instruments. This interpretation arises from his analysis of quantum
measurement, including in the EPR case.
AK: “In particular, our contextual probabilistic investigations demon-
strated that contextual complementarity, wave-particle dualism, is not rigidly
coupled to microworld. Thus we can, in principle, perform experiments with
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macro systems that would demonstrate ‘wave-particle duality,’ but not of
macro objects, but contexts” (p. 7).
AP: Although one might want to see an example of such an experiment
to be able to assess it, I merely observe here that there is no such duality in
Bohr’s interpretation, and especially there are no (continuous) waves, as must
be clear already in the double-slit experiment. I must add that this statement
needs more lucidity in any event.
AK: “We have two theoretical descriptions of this experiment: 1) quantum-
like statistical description; 2) Newtonian classical description. Both theo-
ries give the same statistical distribution of spots on the registration screen.
Quantum-like theory operates with complex waves of probability; there is un-
certainty, Heisenberg-like, relation for position and momentum. Of course,
this relation is the statistical one. Suppose now that some observer could not
provide the verification of Newtonian description, e.g. such an observer is a
star-size observer and its measuring device produce nonnegligible perturba-
tions of our macroscopic charged balls. Such an observer might speculate on
[the] impossibility to find objective phase-space description and even about
waves features of macroscopic balls” (p. 7).
AP: To repeat (this qualifications seems to be necessary at any point of
Khrennikov’s paper), it is one thing to presuppose the possibility of a classical-
like account and it is quite another to actually develop one. In addition,
Khrennikov’s argument here seems to me either incorrect or insufficiently de-
veloped. I do not think that “both theories [quantum and classical] give the
same statistical distribution of spots on the registration screen.” For, if one
could, even in principle, count electrons, say, those passing through the slits in
the double-slit experiments as Newtonian balls—as we indeed can, but only in
one among the two possible complementary arrangements—there would not be
an interference-like pattern of dots resulting from collisions between electrons
and the screen. Thus, complementarity—the necessity of two different, mutu-
ally exclusive, arrangements for a comprehensive account of the situation we
encounter in quantum physics—changes everything here or, rather, precisely
reflects the difference, possibly irreducible, between the classical and the quan-
tum. A Newtonian theory, at least any available Newtonian theory, does not
appear to me to be able to account for this situation. Bohmian theories, which
do account for it, but nonlocally, are not Newtonian.
There may also be an element of terminological and possible substantive
confusion here, insofar as the “classical” configurations that Khrennikov refers
to are in fact computer-generated models developed in discrete rather than
continuous time and their status as classical models (if they indeed could be
seen as classical) requires further explication. Let me, however, offer an argu-
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ment, via Anthony J. Leggett’s elegant exposition, describing a different but
equivalent experiment (in neutron interferometry), in which instead of slits we
consider the initial state A, two intermediate states B and C, and then a final
state E. (The latter is analogous to the state of a “particle” at the point of its
interaction with the screen in the double-slit experiment.) First, we arrange to
block the path via state C, but leave the path via state B open. (In this case
we do not attempt to install any additional devices to check directly whether
the object has in fact passed through state B.) In a large number (say, again,
a million) of trials we record the number of particles reaching state E. Then
we repeat the same number of runs of the experiment, this time blocking the
path via B, and leaving the path via C open. Finally we repeat the experiment
again with the same number of runs, now with both paths open. In Leggett’s
words, “the striking feature of the experimentally observed results is, of course,
summarized in the statement that . . . the number reaching E via ‘either B or
C’ appears to be unequal to the sum of the numbers reaching E ‘via B’ or
‘via C’.”f The probabilities of the outcomes of individual experiments will be
affected accordingly. (This is of course also the situation that leads Khren-
nikov to his use of contextual probability.) The situation is equivalent to the
emergence of the interference pattern when both slits are open in the double-
slit experiment. In particular, in the absence of counters, or in any situation
in which the interference pattern is found, one cannot assign probabilities to
the two alternative “histories” of a “particle” passing through either B or C
on its way to the screen. If we do, the above probability sum law (based in
adding the so-called amplitudes, related to the wave-function, to which one
applies Schro¨dinger’s equation, rather than, as in the classical case, probabil-
ities themselves) would not be obeyed and the conflict with the interference
pattern will inevitably emerge, as Bohr stressed on many occasions. This is
also why the ways of counting probabilities are so different in classical and
quantum physics, as Planck discovered. One may also put it as follows. We
must take into account the possibility of a particle passing through both states
B and C (and through both slits in the double-slit experiments), when both
are open to it, in calculating the probabilities of the outcomes of such exper-
iments. We cannot, however, at least in Bohr’s interpretation, assume either
that such an event in space and time physically occurs for any single particle,
anymore that we can assume that one can walk into a building simultaneously
through two doors, when these doors are sufficiently far apart. The inherently
quantum-mechanical nature of the EPR correlations may be linked to similar
considerations as well. These considerations lead to considerable complica-
f Anthony J. Leggett, “Experimental Approaches to the Quantum Measurement Paradox,”
Foundations of Physics, 18, 9 (1988): 940-41.
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tions in Bohmian theories, which indeed need to have both particles (having
trajectories) and waves, associated with individual particles, to reproduce the
predictions of the standard quantum mechanics, but, again, as a result intro-
duce nonlocality into the theory. It seems to me that much of Khrennikov’s
argument does not pay sufficient attention to these considerations or at least
does not sufficiently address them.
It would be difficult to speculate how a possible “intelligent” observer with
perceptual and reasoning capacities analogous to our own but of the size of
a star would see the physical world in our universe, for example, an object
of the size of a billiard ball. A more interesting question may be whether
there could be “observers” (it is not inconceivable that they actually need to
be very “large” rather than small) in our universe who would in fact ‘’see”
anything on the quantum scale, that is, the scale defined by Planck’s constant
h. I would think that, if they could, the picture would be quite fantastic by
our standards. Perhaps, however, an irreducibly classical perception, such as
our own (defined by the particular constitution of our bodies) is necessary in
order to observe anything to all. My intuitive guess (which could of course
be wrong) is that, given the ultimate physical nature of our universe, different
possible “intelligent” beings in it might see different “classical-like” worlds, but
could never see “the quantum world,” if, again, such terms as “quantum” and
“world” could apply.
AK: “Finally, we remark that the possibility ofH3-description implies that
‘quantum randomness’ does not differ essentially from ‘classical randomness.’
Of course, this contradict[s] to[?] orthodox quantum views to randomness as
fundamental or irreducible randomness. Unfortunately, I could not understand
the latter ideas. Instead of fundamental irreducible quantum randomness, I
prefer to consider well understandable theory of context (complex of experi-
mental physical conditions) depending probabilities” (p. 7).
AP: This, at the very least, needs to be further explicated. It seems to me
that Khrennikov’s argument is in essence of the Bohmian type, insofar as the
statistical nature of quantum mechanics may only reflect our partial knowledge
of a more classical-like configuration. This, again, may or may not be true,
but so far there have been no effective arguments (at least for me and most
physicists), in part in view of the nonlocality of Bohmian theories, that such
is the case. As I said above, one would still need to account for the difference
in counting, reflected already in Planck’s law. In Bohr’s interpretation, in
any event, contextuality entails irreducible randomness in the physical sense
explained above, and not really addressed by Khrennikov.
In his section, “Citation With Comments,” Khrennikov presents ‘’some
citations on orthodox quantum theory and our contextual statistical realist
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comments. We use, in particular, collections of Bohr’s views presented in
papers of H. Folse and A. Plotnitsky” (pp. 7-8). I think that part of the
problem of this section is that the statements Khrennikov discusses are taken
from different works, which are not always linked by Bohr and reflected very
different stages of Bohr’s thinking. The purpose of this section of the article
is unclear to me. I shall, however, comment on it in order to clear up some
misunderstandings (some of them are not uncommon) that appear to me to
affect Khrennikov’s commentary.
AK: (S1) “In contrast to ordinary mechanics, the new quantum mechanics
does not deal with a space-time description of the motion of atomic particles.
It operates with manifolds of quantities which replace the harmonic oscillating
components of the motion and symbolize the possibilities of transition between
stationary states in conformity with the correspondence principle,” N. Bohr.
This is simply the recognition of the restrictiveness of the domain of appli-
cations of quantum theory. I would like to interpret this as the recognition of
incompleteness of quantum theory. However, it was not so for N. Bohr (p.8).
AP: Bohr specifically describes Heisenberg’s “new kinematics” here, which
for the first time enabled correct predictions of the key experiments concerning
electrons through a fully developed mathematical scheme, as opposed to the
patchwork of the old atomic theory of Planck, Einstein, Bohr, and Sommerfeld.
AK: (S2) “ . . . the quantum postulate implies that any observation of
atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation
not be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary phys-
ical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of
observation,” N. Bohr.
The first part of this citation is the manifestation of contextuality. How-
ever, I cannot understand what kind of logic N. Bohr used to proceed to the
second part. The second part can be interpreted as the declaration of the
impossibility of objective, ontic description of reality (p.8).
AP: Bohr’s explains this more rigorously later in the same article, and
better in his later works, along the lines explained above; this is cited from his
Como lecture, where these ideas are as yet somewhat tentative. But even the
Como lecture provides further explanation. It is very difficult to consider this
and indeed most of Bohr’s statements apart from his overall argument.
AK: (S3) “. . . to reserve the word phenomenon for comprehension of effects
observed under given experimental conditions . . . These conditions, which in-
clude the account of the properties and manipulation of all measuring instru-
ments essentially concerned, constitute in fact the only basis for the definition
of the concepts by which the phenomenon is described,” N. Bohr.
I would agree if the last sentence would be continued as “is described in
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quantum formalism” (p. 8).
AP: Bohr only deals with quantum mechanics here. Khrennikov appears
to miss the context of Bohr’s statement. There was no other formalism at
the time and it was this formalism that was used by EPR, to whom this
argument replies. Indeed, rigorously speaking, such phenomena are, as I said,
only predicted by using the quantum-mechanical formalism, and are physically
described classically.
AK: (S4) “. . . by the very nature of the situation prevented from differen-
tiating sharply between an independent behaviour of atomic objects and their
interaction with the means of observation indispensable for the definition of the
phenomena,” N. Bohr. I would agree if the last sentence would be continued
as “of the phenomena described by quantum formalism” (p. 8).
AP: See my comment above, specifically my discussion of complementarity
as only an interpretation of quantum mechanics. And, again, these phenomena
are, in Bohr’s view, definitely not described by quantum formalism, which, in
this view, describes nothing, nothing physical, at all.
AK: “Bohmian mechanics . . .—well, it has its disadvantages, but merely,
mathematical” (p. 9).
AP: I would take issue with this assessment. The main (although indeed
no the only) disadvantage of Bohmian theories is, in my view, their nonlocality,
which is a physical feature, albeit a mathematical consequence, of the theory.
AK: “Finally, Bell’s inequality arguments were interpreted as they should
be interpreted in the orthodox quantum framework, despite very strong counter-
arguments. If all these counter-arguments be taken into account, Bell’s in-
equality activity would look very strange, as a kind of mystification.” AP:
This is extremely unclear. The subject requires a great deal more explication
in any event. It is indeed crucial to the problematic in question, and to the
ongoing debate concerning quantum mechanics and the spirit and the letter of
Copenhagen.
I would like to thank Andrei Khrennikov for this opportunity to discuss the
spirit and the letter of Copenhagen, for other productive exchanges on quan-
tum theory and related subjects, and for organizing two recent conferences,
Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations (2001) and Foundations of
Probability in Physics (2002), at Va¨xjo¨ University and for inviting me to par-
ticipate in them. I am grateful to other participants of these conferences for
many helpful discussions.
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